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 1 
RESEARCHING DEFENDED SUBJECTS WITH THE FREE ASSOCIATION 
NARRATIVE INTERVIEW METHOD 
 
Beyond the rational unitary research subject 
 
In this paper, we illustrate several key differences between our approach to 
interpreting accounts of research subjects and those of other qualitative 
researchers.  In particular, we work with a theoretical premise of a defended, 
rather than unitary, rational subject. The methodological implications that we 
discuss here are two-fold: this subject can best be interpreted holistically; and 
central to this interpretative process are the free associations that 
interviewees make1. 
 
First, however, we want to start one stage further back, and look at the 
problems with survey approaches because these dominate within the fear of 
crime debate that framed our research2.   In broad terms, we wanted to 
explore the apparent irrationality within findings about fear of crime from crime 
surveys.  It may seem remarkable now that without defining what fear of 
crime was, early researchers in the field, like those conducting the first British 
Crime Survey (Hough and Mayhew, 1983), felt able to measure it.  They 
found that women, especially elderly women, are more fearful of crime than 
men.  As a result of this finding being ‘discovered with monotonous regularity’ 
(Gilchrist et al, 1998), the fearful old lady, afraid to venture out after dark, has 
become a common stereotype, as the authors of the 1996 British Crime 
Survey came to bemoan (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1996: 55). Yet, when we 
remind ourselves of the original source of this knowledge, we find it stems 
from the answers by large national samples to the following question: ‘How 
safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?’  The answer was 
required to fit into one of four categories: ‘very safe’, ‘fairly safe’, ‘a bit unsafe’ 
or ‘very unsafe’. 
 
Survey research interviews of this kind, where answers can be quantified on a 
Likert scale, are so prevalent as to be taken for granted in their capacity to 
produce evidence.  Mishler’s extensive consideration of research interviewing 
concluded that the ‘standard approach to interviewing [the survey interview] is 
demonstrably inappropriate for and inadequate to the study of the central 
questions in the social and behavioural sciences’ (1986: ix).  The main reason 
for this is because the approach fails to address how respondents’ meanings 
are related to circumstances.  Reliance on coding isolated responses strips 
them of any remaining context: 
 
The problem raised by so radical a decontextualization of the interview 
at so many different levels...is that respondents’ answers are 
disconnected from essential socio-cultural grounds of meaning.  Each 
answer is a fragment removed from both its setting in the organized 
                                               
1
 One further implication - the intersubjectivity of knowledge production - is discussed in 
Hollway and Jefferson (2000a: chapter 3). 
2
 Our research was entitled ‘Gender Difference, Anxiety and the Fear of Crime’ and was 
supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (award number 
L2102522018)).  All examples throughout this chapter refer to this research project. 
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discourse of the interview and from the life setting of the respondent 
(Mishler 1986:23).   
 
Of course these responses, duly coded, have to be reassembled so as to 
make sense of them. However, ‘when these [fragmented] responses are 
assembled into different subgroups by age, gender and the like, the results 
are artificial aggregates that have no direct representation in the real world’ 
(Mishler 1986: 26). These are the processes which have generated the 
findings about gender and age differences in fear of crime.  As Josselson 
puts it: when we aggregate people, treating diversity as error variable, in 
search of what is common to all, we often learn about what is true of noone in 
particular. (1995: 32) 
 
In response to these limitations of survey and other questionnaire research in 
addressing questions of meaning and causality, many researchers have 
looked to qualitative research. For example, researchers influenced by 
feminism who criticised the early work in fear of crime for not taking into 
account the routine sexual harassment of women or the particular 
vulnerability of women to rape, often used in-depth or semi-structured face-to-
face interviews to ask women (and men in some cases) about their fears3. 
One result of such feminist critiques of traditional ‘scientific’ methods was a 
situation where ‘it began to be assumed that only qualitative methods, 
especially the in-depth, face-to face interview, could really count in feminist 
terms and generate useful knowledge’ (Maynard 1994: 12). More generally, 
face-to-face semi-structured interviewing has become the most common type 
of qualitative research method used in order to find out about people’s 
experiences in context and the meanings these hold. Considerable effort has 
been directed to adapting the traditional interview format so that it is adequate 
to these purposes (see Maynard and Purvis 1994, Berg and Smith 1988, 
Mishler 1986). But, despite this effort, the idea that an interviewee can ‘tell it 
like it is’, that he or she is the incontrovertible expert on his or her own 
experiences, that respondents are transparent to themselves, still remains the 
unchallenged starting point for most of this qualitative, interview-based 
research. 
 
This assumption suggests that qualitative researchers believed that the 
problem they identified in relation to survey-based research would disappear 
when the ‘meaning of events for respondents’ (Farrall et al, 1997: 662) was 
taken into account. We cannot agree. Even if no theoretical assumptions are 
being made about fear of crime since this is left for respondents to define, 
and even if the question asked is no longer a closed one, at least one 
problematic methodological assumption of survey research still applies. This 
is that words mean the same thing to the interviewer and interviewees. In 
other words, the researchers, in taking this for granted, are still assuming that 
                                               
3
 See Stanko (1990) and Junger (1987) for critiques of the early fear of crime research for not 
taking into account the routine sexual harassment of women, and Riger et al, 1978: 278 on 
the particular vulnerability of women to rape.  Stanko, 1990, Stanko and Hobdell, 1993, and 
Gilchrist et al, 1998 used in-depth or semi-structured face-to-face interviews to ask either 
men, or women and men, about their fears. 
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a shared meaning attaches to words: that the question asked will be the one 
that is understood.   
 
This assumption relies on a discredited theory of the transparency of 
language. Current theories of language and communication stress that any 
kind of account can only be a mediation of reality. Hence there can be no 
guarantees that different people will share the same meanings when it comes 
to making sense of an interviewee’s account4. The assumption in qualitative 
research of shared meanings between interviewer and interviewee relies on a 
taken-for-granted notion of the research subject, one which assumes not only 
transparency to the other but self-transparency. In essence, this is the same 
rational unitary subject as that assumed by survey researchers.     
 
The defended subject 
By contrast, the subject we presume in what follows is ‘defended’. It is a 
fundamental proposition in psychoanalytic theory that anxiety is inherent in 
the human condition, specifically that threats to the self create anxiety. 
Defences against such anxiety are mobilised at a largely unconscious level. 
This idea of a dynamic unconscious which defends against anxiety is seen as 
a significant influence on people’s actions, lives and relations.  It means that if 
memories of events are too anxiety-provoking, they will be either forgotten or 
recalled in a modified, more acceptable fashion.  Defences will affect the 
meanings that are available in a particular context and how they are conveyed 
to the listener5 ( who is also a defended subject). 
 
In approaching our defended subject, we were assisted by two concepts: 
gestalt and free association.  However, our understanding of the importance 
of these concepts followed from our pilot attempts to produce a more 
sensitive interview schedule. This - we realised only with hindsight - did not 
break with the question and answer format of the semi-structured interview 
and its didactic consequences.  
 
Mistaken attempts 
 
                                               
4
 In taking into account the context of the interview, clearly the interviewer is a central 
mediating factor in the making of meaning. We analyse these dynamics, within other case-
study examples from the same research, in Hollway and Jefferson, (2000a). 
5
 In her notion of unconscious defences against anxiety, Klein (1988a&b) departs radically 
from the assumption that the self is a single unit, with unproblematic boundaries separating it 
from the external world of objects (both people and things). Her proposition (based on clinical 
work) is that the most primitive defences against anxiety are intersubjective, that is, they come 
into play in relations between people. The unconscious processes of projection (putting out) 
and introjection (taking in) of mental objects results in splitting: the separation of good and 
bad. This splitting of objects into good and bad is the basis for what Klein terms the ‘paranoid-
schizoid’ position; a position to which we may all resort in the face of self-threatening 
occurrences, because it permits us to believe in a good object, on which we can rely, 
uncontaminated by ‘bad’ threats which have been split off and located elsewhere.  Given 
splitting behaviour, the problem of understanding the whole person is rendered even more 
complex.  For case examples from our research illustrating the effects of splitting, see Hollway 
and Jefferson (1999, 2000a).  
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What follows is an extract from one disappointing pilot transcript (broken 
down into three parts to make following it easier) and our critical evaluation of 
it. Graphically and somewhat embarassingly, this evaluation illustrates the 
problems with what we then took to be a focussed, concrete and hard-won 
approach. 
 
 
Tony: What's the crime you most fear? 
Ann: An offence against the person probably 
Tony: The person or your person? 
Ann: Well, erm yes, I fear being hurt myself but I also fear for my 
   children being hurt. 
Tony: OK. Has, have you ever been hurt? 
Ann: Yes. 
Tony: And what did you do? 
Ann: Can you be more specific, what do you mean? 
Tony: Well I mean you choose any incident that you can recall. 
Ann: Where I've been physically hurt?   
Tony: Where you've been physically hurt. 
 
Although the opening question is an attempt to tap concretely into Ann's fear 
of crime, it seems to come across as abstract because introduced abruptly, 
devoid of context, and prior to the build-up of any rapport.  The uncertain 
answer ('probably') matches the unwitting abstractness of the question. The 
interviewer then has to work to focus the answer ('The person or your 
person?'), to make it less abstract, echoing her words where possible ('have 
you ever been hurt?') .  The result is a single word answer, 'yes'.  The 
interviewer again tries to focus the respondent through a 'do' question ('And 
what did you do?'). This only succeeds in producing a request to the 
interviewer to be more specific. This is hardly surprising since no particular 
incident has yet been specified.  In an attempt not to override her meaning-
frame, the interviewer invites her to choose an incident; but this is still too 
general.  Ann's subsequent request for clarification ('Where I've been 
physically hurt?') might be seen as an attempt to ask after the interviewer's 
meaning-frame, what the interviewer is really after. She probably does this 
because that is the kind of relationship that the question and answer 
approach has established; that is, the interviewer defines the agenda. 
 
Ann: Erm, it erm.   Well I've been hurt by people I've been in 
relationships with. Is that the sort of crime you're referring to? 
Tony: That's fine. 
Ann: It's varied what I've done. It depends on 
Tony: From what to what? 
Ann: Yes, it depends on what the circumstances were and whether I 
think I contributed to it or not, how I responded ultimately. 
Tony: So if you thought you contributed to it you did what? 
Ann: My usual response actually, if I describe my response, my 
response pattern to any situation where I've feel threatened, it'll 
probably help to answer the question. If I am threatened physically and 
it's not happened a lot but if I am I notice now that I have a patterned 
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response which is, that I immediately go into shock and that it takes 
me a couple of days to recover from that actual physical shock and I, I 
experience the shock as though it were an accident or you know, 
(Tony: Yes) my body closes down and I can't think about it and I just 
feel very numb and, erm,  after a couple of days with not being able to 
think about it then my mind starts to process it and I start to analyse it. 
I've never ever called the police except on one occasion when my 
children were involved with my ex partner. So I've called the police on 
one occasion. 
Tony:  But as well as going into shock are there other things you do? 
 
Even when the interviewer agrees that an incident where Ann had been 
physically hurt was appropriate, she is still uncertain that being hurt by 'people 
I've been in relationships with' counts (for the interviewer).  Reassurance on 
this score still leaves her unfocussed since her responses have varied ('it 
depends').  Instead of getting her to focus on a particular incident, the 
interviewer picks up on this lead about her various responses. This effectively 
invites her to continue in a generalising mode ('it depends on...the 
circumstances...and whether I think I contributed to it or not').  Perhaps 
realising the error, the interviewer attempts to recoup by specifying a 
'contributory' situation: 'So if you thought you contributed to it you did what?'  
It is still too little; no actual incident has been specified so she plumps for her 
'usual' (i.e. general) response, hoping this will help.  The interviewer allows 
this and learns that usually she goes into shock, and on one occasion (and 
only one occasion) she called the police.  This should have provided two 
openings: one toward her meaning-frame via a further exploration of the issue 
of 'shock'; the other (at last!) toward a specific incident: the time she called 
the police.  In trying to stick to the schedule, the interviewer misses them 
both, clumsily cutting across her meaning-frame concerning shock in pursuit 
of an apparently concrete question: 'But...are there other things you do?' 
 
Ann: Well I feel,  do or feel?  
Tony: Do. 
Ann: It depends.  If I'm able to access the person who's done it to me 
then I usually want to talk to them about it.  Erm, but that's not always 
possible.  What I've found is that when people hurt you they run away 
themselves and you're not able to actually resolve it and so therefore I 
think that exacerbates the shock I feel. 
Tony: Why? 
Ann: Because you're dealing with a range of feelings then (Tony: 
Right) which are not just about the physical assault. 
Tony: Can I just sort of be clear in my own mind what we're talking 
about here. You mentioned threat. Are we talking about threats of 
violence or actual violence? 
 
At this point, Ann half re-introduces her meaning-frame ('Well I feel', a 
reference back to her feelings of shock), before remembering the question 
specified ‘things you do’.  So she asks, 'do or feel?'  Again in the interest of 
(an apparent) concreteness, the interviewer reiterates 'do'. Once again she 
vacillates ('it depends'), and then generalises ('I usually want to talk to them 
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about it .. but that’s not always possible .. when people hurt you they run 
away'). The interviewer responds with a 'why' question, thus inviting further 
speculative theorising as to why someone running away 'exarcerbates the 
shock' she feels. Ann's answer ('Because you're dealing with a range of 
feelings then') makes sense but is still very general. In desperation the 
interviewer seeks clarification as to 'what we're talking about here...Are we 
talking about threats of violence or actual violence?'  Not only has any hint of 
a concrete incident disappeared, but the interviewer seems now to be 
completely adrift, not even knowing whether Ann is talking about 'threats' or 
'actual violence'.   
 
Narrative approaches  
Our pilot approach remained within the framework of the traditional question-
and-answer interview. All structured interviews and most aspects of semi-
structured interviews come under the question-and-answer type, where the 
interviewer sets the agenda and in principle remains in control of what 
information is produced. In this mode, the interviewer is imposing on the 
information in three ways: ‘by selecting the theme and topics; by ordering the 
questions and by wording questions in his or her language’ (Bauer 1996:2). 
Outside of this framework stand narrative and clinical case study approaches, 
in which the researcher’s responsibility is to be a good listener and the 
interviewee is a story-teller, rather than a respondent. 
 
In the narrative approach, the agenda is open to development and change, 
depending on the narrator’s experiences. At the pilot stage, we remained 
stuck in the conventional assumption of social research that the researcher 
asks questions. We could understand the problems in our example in terms 
of Mishler’s (1986) argument that the question-and-answer method of 
interviewing has a tendency to suppress respondents’ stories. It is not just a 
matter of being open to stories within the responses: we asked Ann to 
participate in a pilot interview because we knew she could tell stories about 
her experiences in the informal context in which Wendy knew her.  By trying 
hard to comply with the interviewer’s agenda, Ann was not able to convey her 
own relevant experiences. Chase (1995:2) argues that ‘attending to another’s 
story in the interview context .. requires an altered conception of what 
interviews are and how we should conduct them’, a point we return to below. 
 
According to Polanyi the difference between a story and a report (of the kind 
that is often elicited in the traditional research interview) is that in telling a 
story, the narrator takes responsibility for ‘making the relevance of the telling 
clear’ (quoted in Chase 1995:2). This approach therefore emphasises the 
meaning that is created within the research pair and the context within which 
the account makes sense. It also recognises that the story told is constructed 
(within the research and interview context) rather than a neutral account of a 
pre-existing reality. Stories have conventional structures which are arranged 
to provide coherence and causal sequence (’so then’); they have a beginning, 
middle and end6. According to some, however, the narrative form has an 
                                               
6
 Alternatively stories are seen as having a ‘setting, problem, plan of action and outcome’ 
(Mishler 1986:92). A more complex model of the structure of stories comes from Labov, cited 
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even more central place in human life: ‘there does not exist, and never has 
existed, a people without narratives’ (Barthes, cited in Polkinghorne 1988:14); 
narrative is ‘the primary form by which human experience is made meaningful 
.. it organises human experiences into temporally meaningful episodes’ 
(Polkinghorne 1988:1); ‘thinking, perception, imagination and moral decision-
making are based on narrative structure’ (Sarbin cited in Josselson 
1992:155). More recently self identity has been seen as being achieved by 
narratives of the self (White and Epston 1990). 
 
Claims for the efficacy and appropriateness of a narrative method for studying 
experiences and meaning in context (Mishler 1986, Josselson 1992, 
Riessman 1993) have been subject to the basic problems of any other 
hermeneutic approach. What is the relation of a story to the events it refers 
to?  How is truth compromised by the story teller’s motivations and memory? 
Since one of the defining features of the narrative form is coherence (Linde 
1993, Rosenthal 1993), how does this form affect our knowledge of the 
potential incoherence of life as it is lived? In the language of social science, 
these are questions about the reliability and validity of eliciting narratives as a 
research method.  
 
Some narrative researchers (for example Bauer 1996) have set aside these 
questions by taking the position that the object of narrative analysis is the 
narrative itself, as opposed to the events being narrated or the experiences or 
character of the narrator. This was not so for us when we turned to a narrative 
method. The focus of our analysis is the people who tell us stories about their 
lives: the stories themselves are a means to understand our interviewees 
better. While stories are obviously not providing a transparent account 
through which we learn truths, story-telling stays closer to actual life events 
than methods that elicit explanations. According to Bauer (1996:3) ‘narrations 
are rich in indexical statements’ (by indexical he means ‘reference is made to 
concrete events in place and time’). 
 
Clinical case study approaches  
One response to the perception that survey-type research was losing sight of 
an understanding of whole people in real-life contexts was to look outside 
research to practitioners for models of social knowledge.  Kvale (1999) has 
commented on the neglect of the psychoanalytic interview in research and 
explored the basic epistemological differences between the two domains of 
knowledge, psychoanalysis and social science, that may account for this.  He 
concludes that each could learn from the other. Clinicians work primarily with 
case studies and psychoanalysts have a model of knowledge which places 
primary responsibility on their own involvement in understanding a patient. 
According to Berg and Smith ‘the complex emotional and intellectual forces 
that influence the conduct of our inquiry .. are at once the source of our 
insight and our folly’ (1988:11). As researchers, therefore we cannot be 
detached but must examine our subjective involvement because it will help to 
shape the way that we interpret the interview data. This approach is 
                                                                                                                                      
in Mishler (1986: 80/1): Abstract, Orientation, Complicating Action, Evaluation, Result or 
Resolution and Coda. 
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consistent with the emphasis on reflexivity in the interview, but it understands 
the subjectivity of the interviewer through a model which includes 
unconscious, conflictual forces rather than simply conscious ones: 
the process of self-scrutiny is central to our definition of clinical 
research because it can yield information about the intellectual and 
emotional factors that inevitably influence the researcher’s involvement 
and activity, and at the same time provide information about the 
dynamics of the individual or social system being studied. The self-
scrutiny process is difficult and complex precisely because both 
researcher and the “researched” are simultaneously influencing each 
other. Since this is occurring in ways that initially are out of the 
awareness of the parties involved, scrutiny is an absolutely necessary 
part of social science research (Berg and Smith 1988:31).  
 
In recognising the importance of unconscious dynamics in the research 
interview, this approach also notices the defences against anxiety. Part of the 
problem in our earlier example could be the anxiety of the interviewer. This 
probably had to do with a combination of the unfamiliarity of the (first time) 
situation and developing worries about the success of the interview after high 
expectations of it. More tellingly, what the interviewer had stumbled upon was 
the hornets’ nest of Ann’s painful experiences of partner violence. Positing a 
defended subject enabled us to see that part of Ann’s vacillation was 
probably a largely unconscious sounding out of the interviewer, staying safe 
through comfortable, well-rehearsed generalisations. Utilising the concept of 
the defended subject enabled us also to interpret Ann’s responses as 
established defences working to protect her from her own painful experiences 
of domestic violence (which we knew about prior to the interview). According 
to this approach, her well-rehearsed generalisations about what she does in 
this situation and what she does in that, intelligent and articulate though they 
are, are part of a defensive strategy; a strategy of intellectualising, of 
'managing' painfully confusing emotional experiences through words which 
offer (apparently) the comfort of comprehension and the prospect of control. 
Although we only have evidence of Ann’s defensive strategy in this particular, 
relational, setting of the research interview, it was enough to convince us of 
the need to find an approach which took account of such defenses. 
 
The biographical-interpretative method and the importance of gestalt 
 
At this point, somewhat fortuitously, we came across the biographical-
interpretative method, first developed by German sociologists producing 
accounts of the lives of holocaust survivors and Nazi soldiers (Rosenthal 
1993, Rosenthal and Bar-On 1992, Schutze 1992). The biographical 
interpretative method is part of the narrative tradition in social science 
research, a tradition which has been most developed in life story research 
(see, for example, Plummer,1995). 
 
Given our understanding of the way that unconscious defences affect the 
information that is produced in the research relationship and the way that it is 
interpreted, we wanted to incorporate this idea of the defended subject in our 
use of a narrative method. Schutze’s article, an example of the biographical-
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interpretative tradition, revealed that elicited accounts such as those of Nazi 
soldiers would be highly defensive ones, given the painful subject-matter, 
which needed a methodological strategy to uncover what he calls ‘faded-out 
memories and delayed recollections of emotionally or morally disturbing war 
experiences’ (Schutze 1992: 347). Although Schutze sees ‘some 
intersections between Freud’s impressive theory on repression’ (1992: 359n1) 
and his own method, this insight is not developed. The main theoretical 
principle is not the defended subject, but the idea that there is a 'gestalt' 
informing each person's life which it is the job of biographers to elicit intact, 
and not destroy through following their own concerns (Rosenthal 1990). 
 
The principle of gestalt is based on the idea that the whole is greater than the 
sum of parts. Wertheimer, the founder of gestalt psychology, objected to the 
way that, in his view, modern science proceeded from below to above. He 
believed that it was impossible to 
  
achieve an understanding of structured totals by starting with the 
ingredient parts which enter into them. On the contrary we shall need 
to understand the structure; we shall need to have insight into it. There 
is then some possibility that the components themselves will be 
understood (cited in Murphy and Kovach 1972: 258-9). 
 
This is the principle which we try to apply to our understanding of the ‘whole’ 
text. Wertheimer’s primary law, that of ‘place in context’ (that significance was 
a function of the position in a wider framework), addressed exactly the 
problem of decontextualisation of text which is inherent in the many 
qualitative methods which break up the text through coding segments 
according to theme and then analysing these segments as part of thematic 
categories (the ‘code and retrieve’ method which is characteristic of all 
computer assisted qualitative data analysis). Wertheimer emphasised that 
‘parts are defined by their relation to the system as a whole in which they are 
functioning’ (cited in Murphy and Kovach 1972: 258). Similarly the structuralist 
movement which started in social anthropology and linguistics emphasised 
that meanings could only be understood in relation to a larger whole, whether 
it be the culture, the sentence or the narrative. 
 
The ‘whole’ that was the unit of analysis in our research was not the ‘whole’ 
person (as if that is ever knowable). Rather it was all we managed to 
accumulate relating to a particular person who took part in the research. As 
well as the transcripts from both interviews7, we have our memories of 
meetings with that person; the notes we took after the first meeting and 
subsequent interviews and also, where more than one family member was 
interviewed, what was said about our participant by others.  But this definition 
refers only to an external reality. Maybe the gestalt principle is best 
understood also as the internal capacity for holding those data together in the 
mind. 
 
                                               
7
  We conducted a second interview approximately one week after the first. In between, we 
both listened to the audiotapes and devised a second set of questions, based on the principles 
of the Free Association Narrative Interview  method (see below). 
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The German biographers’ strategy for eliciting narratives - which we adopted 
and adapted - can be summarised in terms of four principles, each designed 
to facilitate the production of the interviewee’s meaning frame, or gestalt:  
 
1) Use open-ended not closed questions, the more open the better 
‘How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark’?, with respondents 
expected to tick one of 4 categories on a Likert scale, is a closed question. 
Our opening question to Ann, ‘what’s the crime you most fear?’, is open, but 
in a narrow way, which may help account for its failure to elicit much from her. 
In linking fear with crime, it reveals what sort of fear interests the interviewer; 
but, in so doing, it may work to suppress the meaning of fear to Ann, which 
may have no apparent connection to crime. To learn about the meaning of 
fear to Ann, a more open question, such as ‘what do you most fear?’, would 
be necessary. The presumption of the biographical method is that it is only in 
this way, by tracking Ann’s fears through her meaning frames, that we are 
likely to discover the ‘real’ meaning of fear of crime to her; how it relates to 
her life.  
 
2) Elicit stories 
Eliciting stories has the virtue of indexicality; of anchoring people’s accounts 
to events that have actually happened. To that extent such accounts have to 
engage with reality, even while compromising it in the service of self-
protection. Eliciting stories from people is not always a simple matter, 
especially from those who feel their lives lack sufficient interest or worth to 
justify ‘a story’. And, no doubt for a variety of different reasons, people’s story-
telling ability varies enormously. However, given the importance of the 
narrative form to all social communication, a story is often chosen to answer 
even direct questions, especially when interviewees are uncertain what is 
required. It’s a ‘well, this is the story of my relationship to your chosen topic, 
you decide whether it’s what you’re after’ sort of reply. The particular story 
told, the manner and detail of its telling, the points emphasised, the morals 
drawn, all represent choices made by the story-teller. Such choices are 
revealing, often more so than the teller suspects. This characteristic of story-
telling, to contain significances beyond the teller’s intentions, is what it shares 
with the psychoanalytic method of free associations. The implications of this 
for the traditional interview method are a recommendation to  ‘narrativise 
topics’, that is, to turn questions about given topics into story-telling 
invitations.  In this light the open-ended ‘what do you most fear?’, which could 
elicit a one-word answer rather than a story, would be modified to read ‘tell 
me about your experiences of fear’ or, better, because more specific, ‘tell me 
about a time when you were fearful’. 
 
3) Avoid 'why' questions  
With Ann, we saw that a why question elicited an intellectualisation. While this 
was appropriate to the question, it was uninformative in terms of the research 
questions. 
 
At first glance this is the most surprising principle since it is counter-intuitive: 
surely people’s own explanations of their actions or feelings are useful routes 
to understanding them? Indeed, researchers sometimes assume that they 
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can simply translate their research question into the question for interviewees. 
Sacks for example, found that because she asked sociological questions, her 
women interviewees offered sociological responses, but ‘the abstraction of 
such talk - its disconnection from their actual lives, made it hollow’ (cited in 
Chase 1995:4). She concluded that it was a mistake to ask those kinds of 
question.  However people can only be their own best explainers if they 
conform to the model of the rational, information-processing subject of 
psychology. This, we are arguing, leaves a lot out and distorts researchers’ 
views of subjectivity. 
 
4) Follow up using respondents' ordering and phrasing  
This involves attentive listening and possibly some note-taking during the 
initial narration, in order to be able to follow up themes in their narrated order.  
It preserves the form of the whole response.  In doing this, the respondent's 
own words and phrases should be used in order to respect and retain the 
interviewee’s meaning frames. As always, the follow-up questions constructed 
should be as open as possible and framed so as to elicit further narratives. 
 
For the German biographers, the method entails a single, open, initial 
question which is also an invitation: 'Please, tell me your life story' (Rosenthal 
1990)8. We are not biographers or life story researchers and have adapted 
the questions in this light. Our interest in specific events has been labelled as 
‘focused interviews’ by Mishler (1986:99). In both cases, the art and the skill 
of the exercise is to assist narrators to say more about their lives (to assist the 
emergence of gestalts) without at the same time offering interpretations, 
judgements, or otherwise imposing one’s own relevancies as interviewers, 
which would thus destroy the interviewee's gestalt.  Apparently simple, it 
required discipline and practice to transform ourselves from the highly visible 
asker of our questions to the almost invisible, facilitating catalyst to their 
stories. Being ‘almost invisible’ does not imply a belief in an objective 
interviewer who has no effects on the production of accounts; it means not 
imposing a structure on the narrative. 
 
The importance of free association 
 
This is not the place to explore fully the interesting question of the relationship 
between the German sociologist-biographers' understanding of gestalt and 
our psychoanalytically-derived understanding of anxiety. What we would like 
to draw attention to are the similarities between the principle of respecting the 
narrator's gestalt and the psychoanalytic method of free association. By 
asking the patient to say whatever comes to mind, the psychoanalyst is 
eliciting the kind of narrative that is not structured according to conscious 
logic, but according to unconscious logic; that is the associations follow 
pathways defined by emotional motivations, rather than rational intentions. 
According to psychoanalysis, unconscious dynamics are a product of 
attempts to avoid or master anxiety.   
 
                                               
8
  This is not always the question. Rosenthal (1993:71) asked what were, in effect, 
psychological questions in her research on coming to terms with the interviewees’ National 
Socialist past. 
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Freud allowed the patient to ‘choose the subject of the day’s work’ in order 
that he could ‘start out from whatever surface [the patient’s] unconscious 
happens to be presenting to his notice at the moment’ (quoted in Kerr, 
1994:98). As Kerr (1994:98) points out, by allowing the patient to set the 
agenda, ‘this was the method of truly free associations’. In our case, we 
invited interviewees to tell us about their experiences of crime, risk, safety 
and anxiety (our core theoretical concerns) and then followed their 
associations wherever these happened to take the interview, on the grounds 
that these would be more unconsciously revealing than the meanings we 
might introduce. 
 
This suggests that anxieties and attempts to defend against them, including 
the identity investments these give rise to, provide the key to a person's 
gestalt. By eliciting a narrative structured according to the principles of free 
association, therefore, we secure access to a person’s concerns which would 
probably not be visible using a more traditional method. While a common 
concern of both approaches is to elicit detail, narrative analysis has a 
preoccupation with coherence which we do not share. Free associations defy 
narrative conventions and enable the analyst to pick up on incoherences (for 
example, contradictions, elisions, avoidances) and accord them due 
signficance. 
 
The initial narrative questions 
 
Following our attendance at a biographical-interpretative method workshop, 
we set about revising our interview schedule.  We considered asking one 
single question (as the German biographers do), but our three-part theoretical 
structure - crime/victimisation; risk/safety; anxiety/worry - which evolved from 
the fact that we were researching specifically into fear of crime, seemed to 
provide an important frame for eliciting what we wanted to know.  Life stories 
can be structured by an infinite number of themes, but our research provided 
a particular frame that we could not ignore. We decided, therefore, upon six 
questions deriving from our theoretical structure and a seventh about moving 
into the area. 
 
Interview One Questions.  
 
1a. Can you tell me about how crime has impacted on your life 
 since  you've been living here? 
1b. [follow up in terms of detail and time periods, following order of 
 narrative] 
2a. Can you tell me about unsafe situations in your life since you've 
 been living here? 
2b.  [as 1b] 
3a. Can you think of something that you've read, seen or heard 
 about  recently that makes you fearful?  Anything [not 
 necessarily about crime]. 
3b. [as 1b] 
4a. Can you tell me about risky situations in your life since you've 
 been living here? 
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4b. [as 1b] 
5a. Can you tell me about  times in your life recently when you've 
 been anxious? 
5b. [as 1b] 
6a. Can you tell me about  earlier times in your life when you've 
 been anxious? 
6b. [as 1b] 
7a. Can you tell me what it was like moving to this area? 
7b. [as 1b] 
 
It can be argued that by asking the questions we ask, notably by asking about 
anxiety, we produce the anxiety that we are seeking to establish empirically. 
Of course all research in a sense produces its answers by the very frame 
through which the questions are set. No frame is ever neutral, and neither 
was ours.  However, as the responses of our interviewees made clear, the 
diversity of the stories elicited demonstrated that their accounts were not 
constructed by our questions. This, we feel, is related to our central idea that 
people’s lives have a biographically unique ‘reality’ which our open narrative 
questions were designed to elicit. Only if this were not the case could it be 
argued that the answers given by respondents are merely ‘produced’ by the 
discursive frame of the questions. 
 
Question one aims to elicit any associations to crime. We worded it this way 
so that it did not assume victimisation, and indeed it elicited stories about 
criminal involvement from several young men. Usually it provided an account 
of criminal victimisations directly to the respondent and of crimes happening 
locally. Though it did often elicit stories as it was intended to, we now 
consider this question to be insufficiently narrativised since it invites 
respondents to talk about the general ‘impact of crime’ on their life over, in 
some cases, a very long period (‘since you’ve been living here’). The best 
questions require the interviewee to be specific about times and situations: 
thus, a better question would have been, ‘can you tell me about times when 
crime has impacted on your life since you’ve been living here’. The (b) 
questions follow the principle of respecting the respondents’ meaning frames: 
remaining faithful to the order and wording in which they presented their 
associations (see below for a detailed example).  Questions two and four 
elicited stories relating to safety and risk respectively, providing us with two 
routes to the same theoretical point.  Safety is the same concept that is used 
in the British Crime Survey question (how safe do you feel..), but in the way 
we framed this question, we did not assume fear.  While the notion of being 
'at risk' is similar, we wanted to broaden out the question so as not to talk 
specifically about risk of criminal victimisation. We also wished to leave open 
whether a respondent associated to being at risk or to being a risk-taker.  
Question three was designed to explore some links between fear of crime and 
discourses available in the media.  Questions five and six were both about 
anxiety. These were separated into recent and past anxiety in recognition of 
the importance, according to psychoanalytic theory, of childhood trauma in 
producing adult fears and chronic anxiety.  Question seven was added in 
order to take into account that a person's perception of a neighbourhood will 
be influenced by comparing it with where they lived previously.  This question 
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asked for stories about moving in order to elicit such comparisons.  It was 
also likely to be a neutral question with which to end. 
 
The questions did not always elicit different stories.  However, the different 
frames of the questions meant that people could elaborate different 
associations to the same memory.  After the first question we were not asking 
specifically about crime, although the overall frame in which the research 
interview was presented defined crime as a key theme.  In question three, we 
widened the frame specifically by asking about any media stimulus that had 
made people fearful, giving respondents explicit permission to broaden out.  
This was informed by our hypothesis that generalised anxiety might become 
invested in, and be expressed by, fear of crime, or it might be expressed in 
other concerns, for example environmental pollution.  Any associations to the 
question were therefore encouraged and legitimately within our interests. 
 
Developing our free-assocation narrative interview (FANI) 
 
How did our new, story-based approach fare when put to the test?  In this 
section we show how free associations in the narrative revealed significant 
personal meanings which were not necessarily obvious at the time. 
 
Eight elements or an emergent gestalt 
In what follows, we use the transcript of the beginning of the first interview 
with Jane, a nineteen year-old white woman, single mother of two children, 
aged two and three, living on a high-crime council housing estate. (The 
interviewer’s question was a version of question 1a, above, so this excerpt 
was at the very beginning of the taped interview.) 
 
Wendy:Tell me first of all how crime has had any effects on you since 
you moved here. 
Jane:  Em, it's just you know, like, we got broken into once.  But they 
didn't seem to take owt. They just took stuff outside there, and that 
were it. They must er, I must 'ave come 'ome and they were 'ere [1]. 
And just - I see police, y'know, bringing cars up from fields at back 
[2].There's always motor bikes.  Kids on motor bikes [3].  They just 
don't seem to do nowt [4].  They just see 'em go past and -- it's just like 
- you know things like - there's a 'ouse up there and some kids 'ave 
broken into it.  It were like in daylight.  Kicking door down and 
smashing window - nobody were doing nowt [5].  There was somebody 
living next door, people across road, nobody seemed to do owt [6].  
And they're all their kids.  And it's like - they just let the kids do what 
they want. They don't bother [7]. (Wendy:Right). There're like, there's 
like one and two year-olds just playing out on the street and it's all that 
kind of thing [8]. 
 
At first sight, the interview looks far from promising. It is not always clear what 
Jane is referring to and she dries up quite quickly. This excerpt does not have 
the coherence or conventional structure of a story. The interviewer's 
technique involves not intervening until the interchange is handed back and 
identifying the themes which are apparent, so as to return to them in the order 
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of their appearance to elicit further detail.  Eight themes were identifiable in 
this short extract. Jane mentions the break-in, summed up in four short 
sentences [1]. Her next association [2] is to the police, in the context of a 
different crime: police retrieving stolen cars from where they have been 
dumped. This leads her [3] to think of another instance of local joy-riding: kids 
on motor bikes. Her theme is still the police [4] (though she does not specify 
this here, the interviewer does not intervene to clarify): the police go past, but 
'don't seem to do owt'. In mid-sentence Jane shifts to a different example of 
inactivity [5], in this instance where 'nobody were doing nowt', even though 
kids had broken into a house and were vandalising it. She elaborates on the 
nobody [6], instancing neighbours' inactivity in the face of kids breaking the 
law. Her train of association is then [7] to parents who do not stop these 
activities and finally [8] to parents' more general negligence as instanced by 
very young children playing out unsupervised. 
 
Because this pathway of associations is produced out of Jane’s concerns, the 
hypothesis is that the whole will signify more than the sum of the parts (this is 
definitional of a gestalt).  A quick-witted interviewer, who has already taken 
biographical details, may have realised the significance of where this young 
woman ended her first contribution.  Certainly as the interview developed, 
there were numerous pointers to the fact that Jane's relation to the council 
estate where she had lived for twelve months was informed more than 
anything else by her concern for how she was going to bring up her two 
young boys in this context of precocious delinquency.  Her disapproval of the 
negligence of some parents on the estate was an expression of her difference 
in this respect ('I couldn't believe it, me', 'Mum couldn't believe it'), on which 
were pinned, presumably, her hopes that her children would not go the same 
way. This was all the more important given that she and her family 
represented one of the stereotypes of the negligent mother: a young, single, 
white parent, with mixed-race children. This key to her gestalt manifested 
itself at the first opportunity, that is, at the end of her first unimpeded 
response to a question framed for maximum openness9. It had actually 
entailed her going 'off' the question, in the sense that she had started by 
listing some crimes and then moved on to other, non-criminal, issues which 
for her were intimately associated, but of greater concern. It is her emotional 
concerns which produce this pathway of associations. She eventually 
mentioned this core concern, namely, the difficulty of bringing up children in 
such a delinquency-prone environment, later in the first interview: 'It's just with 
these [her children] getting older. It's like everybody round 'ere, I mean they're 
- dunno - it's attitudes and that.' To have confined the interview to crime would 
have been to rule out this, her central preoccupation. In so doing, it would 
have risked misunderstanding the meaning of crime and fear of crime in her 
life. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                               
9
  We found this often to be the case, but it was usually not until we had familiarised ourselves 
with the whole two interviews that we recognised it.  It is an example of the whole giving extra 
meaning to a part. 
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In this chapter we have discussed the development of a method which we 
believe is adequate to addressing some of the central issues in the 
behavioural and social sciences. By these we mean questions which involve 
the understanding of people’s subjectivities in the context of events which 
they bring to mind and convey, in the intersubjective context of the interview, 
using their own expressions. 
 
The turn to language in the social sciences has opened up research to 
qualitative methods, which emphasise the importance of meaning and 
context. However, most of the new qualitative methods such as discourse 
analysis and narrative analysis still assume rational, unitary subjects, if not 
explicitly, then by default. The free association narrative interview (FANI) 
method assumes, in contrast, defended subjects. When people are assumed 
not necessarily to be able to tell it like it is, because their own remembered 
actions may not be transparent to them on account of defences against 
anxiety, a different approach is required. For this approach we borrowed the 
psychoanalytic principle of free association, which assumes that unconscious 
connections will be revealed through the links that people make if they are 
free to structure their own narratives. This adds a further dimension to the 
principle of preserving the whole of the account, rather than breaking it down 
into parts. The ‘form’ or gestalt reveals the unconscious dynamics which 
structure memory and hence a person’s subjective investment in their past 
actions and experiences. 
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